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Signaling the Strategic Value of Knowledge

Belk College of Business Administration, University of North Carolina—Charlotte, 9201 University City Blvd, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001, USA

Edward Levitas

School of Business Administration, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, 3202 N. Maryland Ave, Milwaukee, WI 53211, USAlevitas{at}uwm.edu

Firms competing primarily on knowledge resources face problems in informing relevant external stakeholders about the value of that knowledge without losing its value. This knowledge may be transferred to stakeholders only at great expense, or that transfer of knowledge to stakeholders may simultaneously promote its transfer to competitors. By conceptualizing firms and the environments within which they compete to differ in levels of uncertainty, this paper develops a framework to examine signaling mechanisms firms can use to effectively signal the value of their knowledge to two key stakeholder groups, the capital and labor markets, while avoiding associated transfer problems.

Journal of Management, Vol. 30, No. 5, 685-702 (2004)
DOI: 10.1016/j.jm.2004.04.002


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