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The Impact of Insider Power on Fraudulent Financial Reporting

Paul Dunn

Department of Accounting and Finance, Taro Hall, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ont., Canada L2S 3A1pdunn{at}taro.bus.brocku.ca

This study examines the relationship between top management team duality and the decision to release false financial information. Using a matched sample of 103 firms that were convicted of issuing fraudulent financial statements in the period from 1992 to 1996, the results show that this form of illegal corporate behavior is more likely to occur when there is a concentration of power in the hands of insiders. For these firms, insiders control the top management team and the Board of Directors by simultaneously occupying the key managerial positions of clout within the firm while also sitting on the Board (duality), and through their ownership interest in the firm.

Journal of Management, Vol. 30, No. 3, 397-412 (2004)
DOI: 10.1016/j.jm.2003.02.004
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