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Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Value Implications: A Review and a Contingency Framework

Chamu Sundaramurthy

University of Cincinnati

This paper reviews literatures on the two competing theoretical views of the antitakeover provisions–shareholder value relationship — managerial entrenchment and shareholder interests — and offers a contingency framework to reconcile these views. This framework, based on a broader agency theory perspective and the organizational literatures on power, incorporates two key moderators: corporate board and shareholder monitoring, and draws attention to when rather than on whether antitakeover provisions enhance or erode shareholder value.

Journal of Management, Vol. 26, No. 5, 1005-1030 (2000)
DOI: 10.1177/014920630002600501
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[Abstract] [PDF]